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Abstract
We estimate a model of strategic voting with incomplete information in which com-
mittee members – judges in the US courts of appeals – have the opportunity to com-
municate before casting their votes. The model is characterized by multiple equilibria,
and partial identification of model parameters. We obtain confidence regions for these
parameters using a two-step estimation procedure that allows flexibly for characteris-
tics of the alternatives and the individuals. To quantify the effects of deliberation on
outcomes, we compare the probability of mistakes in the court with deliberation with a
counterfactual of no pre-vote communication. We find that for most configurations of
the court in the confidence set, in the best case scenario deliberation produces a small
potential gain in the effectiveness of the court, and in the worst case it leads to large
potential losses.
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1 Introduction
Deliberation is an integral part of collective decision-making. Instances of voting in leg-
islatures, courts, boards of directors, shareholder meetings, and academic committees are
generally preceded by some form of communication among members, ranging from free to
fully structured, and from public to private or segmented.
Does talking affect what people actually do? While a rosy picture of deliberation as an open-
minded exchange of ideas suggests that it influences behavior, many real-world examples
show that formal instances of deliberation can become hollow, with speeches being allowed
but unheard (think of legislators’ speeches in the chambers of Congress).1 Even more,
deliberation can possibly be counterproductive to the interests of some committee members,
steering collective outcomes in the direction that more influential committee members would
prefer. The question then is: does deliberation allow committee members to overcome their
initial differences of opinion and points of views and increase the efficiency of decision-
making? Or is it detrimental to effective decision-making?
How much deliberation can achieve in any given situation will naturally depend on the
characteristics of the individuals making the decision and the choice situation. When the
committee members have common goals, they should have incentives to exchange informa-
tion truthfully, and act on it cohesively (Coughlan (2000), Goeree and Yariv (2011)). When
instead committee members disagree, it will generally be harder to have them truthfully
report their information to others. How much they will do so depends on how informa-
tive their private information is relative to the prior beliefs and biases of other committee
members, and on their expectations about how others will communicate.
Our goal in this paper is to quantify the effect of deliberation on collective choices. To do
this we structurally estimate a model of voting with deliberation. This approach allows us
to disentangle committee members’ preferences, information, and strategic considerations,
and ultimately, to compare equilibrium outcomes under deliberation with a counterfactual
scenario in which pre-vote communication is precluded.
We focus on decisions of the U.S. courts of appeals on criminal cases. The appellate court
setting is attractive for this analysis for three reasons. First, appellate courts make decisions
on issues in which there is an underlying common value component; a correct decision
under the law, even if this can be arbitrarily hard to grasp given limited information. This
environment allows us to evaluate the effect of deliberation on the efficiency of collective
1Even in these cases deliberation might be important for outcomes, although here the relevant commu-
nication might involve private messages among groups of legislators.
1
outcomes. Second, courts of appeals are small committees, composed of only three judges.
This allows us to capture relevant strategic considerations in a relatively simple environment.
Third, within each circuit, judges are assigned to panels and cases on an effectively random
basis. The random assignment norm minimizes the impact of “case selection”, whereby
appellants are more likely to pursue cases in courts composed of more sympathetic judges.
We consider a simple decision-making model, tailored to the application. Three judges
decide whether to uphold or overturn the decision of the lower court by simple majority
vote. Whether the decision should be overturned or not is unobservable, for both the
econometrician and the judges. Judges only observe a private signal, the precision of which
is individual specific, and differ in the payoff of incorrectly overturning and upholding a
decision of the lower court. The bias and the precision of judges’ private information
is allowed to vary with characteristics of the case and the individual. To allow flexible
communication, we consider communication equilibria (Forges (1986), Myerson (1986)),
following Gerardi and Yariv (2007).
Because the incentive for any individual member to convey her information truthfully de-
pends on her expectations about how others will communicate, any natural model of delib-
eration will have a large multiplicity of equilibria. Since this is also the case in our setting,
the conventional maximum likelihood approach does not apply without an equilibrium se-
lection mechanism. Instead, we base our estimation and inference solely on equilibrium
conditions. These equilibrium conditions do not point identify the structural parameters
characterizing judges’ biases and quality of information. For this reason, we obtain confi-
dence regions for these parameters using a two-step estimation procedure that allows flexibly
for characteristics of the alternatives and the individuals.
Our main result is a measure of the effect of deliberation in collective decision-making: how
much do outcomes differ because of deliberation? To do this, we compare the equilibrium
probability of error with deliberation with the probability of error that would have occurred
in the absence of deliberation for the same court and case characteristics.
The comparison leads to mostly discouraging results for the prospects of deliberation. For
most comparable points in the confidence set, in the best case deliberation produces a small
gain in the effectiveness of the court, and in the worst case it leads to large losses. Consider
for instance courts with the most competent judges. The minimum equilibrium error prob-
ability with deliberation is less than 5 pp lower than the corresponding error probability
without deliberation. Yet at the same time, the maximum equilibrium error probability
with deliberation is more than 25 pp higher than the corresponding error probability with-
out deliberation. Especially, if we restrict attention to courts with small preference diversity
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and highly competent judges, the latter number becomes as high as 60 pp.
The previous comparison is completely agnostic about the determinants of equilibrium
selection in future play. If, instead, we restrict attention to equilibria consistent with
the observed data, the prospects for deliberation are rather bleak. As in the case of all
equilibria, the maximum equilibrium probability of error with deliberation generally vastly
exceeds the corresponding figure maximum without deliberation. In addition, for a large
number of points in the CS, the minimum equilibrium probability of error with deliberation
across equilibria consistent with the data is higher than the minimum probability of error
without deliberation. For 20% of the points in the confidence set, for instance, the minimum
equilibrium probability of error without deliberation is below 1%. The corresponding figure
for equilibria consistent with the data is 23%. Furthermore, for more than eighty percent of
all comparable points in the confidence set, all equilibria with deliberation are worse than
all equilibria without deliberation. Thus, although in the best case scenario deliberation
can potentially reduce mistakes vis a vis the benchmark of no deliberation, in the selection
of equilibria that is consistent with the data these potential gains are not realized. Instead,
communication on average leads to large losses in the effectiveness of the court.
Surprisingly, the more unfavorable results for deliberation obtain when judges are highly
competent (i.e., when judges’ private signals are very precise). This is because the maximum
equilibrium probability of error with deliberation actually increases with the competence of
judges in the court, independently of the direction and level of their bias. The reason for
this result is that judges’ best responses in the game with deliberation are very sensitive
to their expectations about how other individuals will communicate. And since judges care
directly about the content of each others’ messages, the effect of these beliefs is larger the
more valuable is the information held by other members of the court.
In addition to speaking of the effect of deliberation on outcomes, our results also provide a
new explanation for the large proportion of cases decided unanimously in the US court of
appeals. This feature is commonly interpreted in the literature to suggest that judges are
either like-minded from the outset, or have an intrinsic desire to compromise (see Fischman
(2007) and references therein). Our results suggest an alternative interpretation. They
suggest that competent judges with heterogeneous preferences can often agree after delib-
erating. Thus, a high rate of unanimous decisions does not imply either agreement ex ante,
or a desire to put forward a “unified” stance in each case. Instead, it can be a consequence
of communication among competent individuals with heterogeneous preferences.
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2 Related literature
The structural estimation of voting models with incomplete information is a relatively recent
endeavor in empirical economics. This paper extends several recent papers examining voting
behavior in committees with incomplete information and common values (Iaryczower and
Shum, (2012b, 2012a); Iaryczower, Lewis, and Shum (2011)).2 In those papers committee
members are assumed to vote without deliberating prior to the vote. This paper takes the
analysis one step further, by allowing explicitly for communication among judges. As we
show below, this extension is far from a trivial one, as the deliberation stage introduces
multiple equilibria, rendering the conventional estimation approach inapplicable.
In terms of estimation and inference, this paper draws upon recent-developed tools from
the econometric literature on partial identification (eg. Chernozhukov, Hong, and Tamer
(2007), Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011)). A closely-related paper is Kawai and
Watanabe (forthcoming), who study the partial identification of a strategic voting model
using aggregate vote share data from Japanese municipalities.
Our basic model of collective decision-making builds on Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998),
allowing for heterogeneous biases and quality of information (all of which are public infor-
mation). To this we add deliberation as in Gerardi and Yariv (2007), considering communi-
cation equilibria.3 This is an attractive model of voting with deliberation because the set of
outcomes induced by communication equilibria coincides with the set of outcomes induced
by sequential equilibria of any cheap talk extension of the underlying voting game.
Coughlan (2000), and Austen-Smith and Feddersen, (2005, 2006) introduce an alternative
approach in this context, extending the voting game with one round of public deliberation.
In essence, both papers allow committee members to carry out a straw poll prior to the
vote (in the case of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005, 2006), this includes a third mes-
sage, e.g. abstention). Coughlan (2000) shows that if committee members are sufficiently
homogeneous, there is an equilibrium in which individuals vote sincerely in the straw poll,
making all private information public. Austen-Smith and Feddersen, (2005, 2006) show that
a similar result holds for a committee of size three when biases also are private information
2Iaryczower, Katz, and Saiegh (2012) uses a similar approach to study information transmission among
chambers in the U.S. Congress. For structural estimation of models of voting with private values and
complete information see Poole and Rosenthal (1985, 1991), Heckman and Snyder (1997), Londregan (1999),
Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004) – for the US Congress– and Martin and Quinn, (2002, 2007) – for
the US Supreme Court. Degan and Merlo (2009), De Paula and Merlo (2009), and Henry and Mourifie
(forthcoming) consider nonparametric testing and identification of the ideological voting model.
3Our model therefore is a particular case of Gerardi and Yariv (2007). In this paper, Gerardi and Yariv
focus on a comparison of the set of communication equilibria across different voting rules. They show that
every outcome that can be implemented with a non-unanimous voting rule r can also be implemented in
communication equilibria with a non-unanimous rule r′.
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if committee members are moderate enough, and provide a comparison of equilibria with
partial revelation of information under simple majority and unanimity.4
While we are not aware of other papers analyzing deliberation with field data in a setting
similar to the one considered here, some recent papers have analyzed deliberation in lab-
oratory experiments. Guarnaschelli, McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), using the straw poll
setting of Coughlan (2000), show that subjects do typically reveal their signal (above 90%
of subjects do so), but that contrary to the theoretical predictions, individuals’ private in-
formation has a significant effect on their final vote. Goeree and Yariv (2011) show that
when individuals can communicate freely, they typically disclose their private information
truthfully and use public information effectively (as in Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005)
bias is private information, so individuals are identical ex ante).5
Finally, equilibria of voting with deliberation can lead to panel effects in voting. For papers
studying panel effects in the courts of appeals see Fischman (2007), Kastellec (2011, 2013),
and Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010).
3 The Model
We consider a model of voting in a small committee, tailored to cases from the US appellate
courts. We allow for pre-vote deliberation amongst the judges – that is, for judges to discuss
the case with each other, and potentially to reveal their private information to each other.
Our model is based on Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) and Gerardi and Yariv (2007).
There are three judges, i = 1, 2, 3. Judge i votes to uphold (vi = 0) or overturn (vi = 1)
the decision of the lower court. The decision of the court, v ∈ {0, 1} is that of the majority
of its members; i.e. overturns (v = ψ(~v) = 1) if and only if
∑
i vi ≥ 2.
We assume that the goal of judge i is that the decision of the court follows her own best
understanding of how the law applies to the particulars of the case. There is room for conflict
and interpretation because whether the decision of the lower court should be overturned
(ω = 1) or upheld (ω = 0) according to the law is itself unobservable. Instead, each judge i
only observes a private signal ti ∈ {0, 1} that is imperfectly correlated with the truth; i.e.,
Pr(ti = k|ω = k) = qi > 1/2 for k = 0, 1. The parameter qi captures the informativeness of
4The complication in the analysis comes from the fact that players condition on being pivotal both at
the voting and the deliberation stage. For other models of deliberation, see Li, Rosen, and Suen (2001),
Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani (2003), Meirowitz (2006), and Landa and Meirowitz (2009), Lizzeri and
Yariv (2011).
5For other experimental results on deliberation, see McCubbins and Rodriguez (2006) and Dickson, Hafer,
and Landa (2008).
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i’s signals.6 The judges’ signals are independent from each other conditional on ω.
Judge i suffers a cost pii ∈ (0, 1) when the court incorrectly overturns the lower court (v = 1
when ω = 0) and of (1 − pii) when it incorrectly upholds the lower court (v = 0 when
ω = 1).7 The payoffs of v = ω = 0 and v = ω = 1 are normalized to zero. Thus given
information I, judge i votes to overturn if and only if Pri(ω = 1|I) ≥ pii, or, equivalently, if
and only if Pri(I|ω = 1)|/Pri(I|ω = 0) ≥ pii1−pii
1−ρ
ρ , where ρ ≡ Pr(ω = 1) denotes justices’
common prior probability that the decision of the lower court should be overturned.8 For
convenience, we let θ ≡ (ρ, ~q).
In the absence of deliberation, this setting describes a voting game G. As in Gerardi and
Yariv (2007), we model deliberation by considering equilibria of an extended game in which
judges exchange messages after observing their signals and before voting. In particular, we
consider a cheap talk extension of the voting game that relies on a fictional mediator, who
helps the judges communicate. In this augmented game, judges report their signals ~t to
the mediator, who then selects the vote profile ~v with probability µ(~v|~t), and informs each
judge of her own vote. The judges then vote. A communication equilibrium is a sequential
equilibrium of this cheap talk extension in which judges (i) convey their private information
truthfully to the mediator, and (ii) follow the mediator’s recommendations’ in their voting
decisions (we describe the equilibrium conditions formally below). A powerful rationale for
focusing on the set of communication equilibria, M , is that the set of outcomes induced by
communication equilibria coincides with the set of outcomes induced by sequential equilibria
of any cheap talk extension of G (see Gerardi and Yariv (2007)).
We can now define communication equilibria more formally. As we described above, in
a communication equilibrium judges (i) convey their private information truthfully to the
mediator, and (ii) follow the mediator’s recommendations’ in their voting decisions. These
define two sets of incentive compatibility conditions, which we call the “deliberation stage”
and “voting stage” constraints respectively.
6Assuming qi > 1/2 is without loss of generality, because if qi < 1/2 we can redefine the signal as 1− ti.
The assumption that the signal quality does not depend on ω is made only for simplicity.
7Thus, pii < 1/2 reflects a bias towards upholding (or towards the Petitioner), while pii > 1/2 reflects a
bias towards overturning (or towards the Respondent). These preconceptions can reflect a variety of factors
inducing a non-neutral approach to this case, such as ingrained theoretical arguments about the law, personal
experiences, or ideological considerations.
8Note that since ω is assumed to be unobservable, there is always information that would make any two
justices disagree about a case. Moreover, if sufficiently biased, two justices can disagree almost always. In
particular, with pi ≈ 0 (or pi ≈ 1), justice i is almost always ideological. On the other hand, when pi = 1/2
for all i, the setting boils down to an unbiased, pure common values model.
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Voting Stage. At the voting stage, private information has already been disclosed to the
mediator. Still the equilibrium probability distributions µ(·|~t) over vote profiles ~v must be
such that each judge i wants to follow the mediator’s recommendation vi. Hence we need
that for all i = 1, 2, 3, for all vi ∈ {0, 1}, and for all ti ∈ {0, 1},∑
t−i
p(t−i|ti; θ)
∑
v−i
[
ui(ψ(vi, v−i),~t)− ui(ψ(1− vi, v−i),~t)
]
µ(~v|~t) ≥ 0, (3.1)
where as usual t−i ≡ (tj , tk) and v−i ≡ (vj , vk) for j, k 6= i. Here p(t−i|ti; θ) denotes the
conditional probability mass function of t−i given ti, and ui(ψ(~v),~t) denotes the utility of
judge i when the decision is ψ(~v) and the signal profile is ~t. Note that ui(ψ(vi, v−i),~t) −
ui(ψ(1 − vi, v−i),~t) = 0 whenever v−i /∈ Pi ≡ {(vj , vk) : vj 6= vk}. Then (3.1) is equivalent
to (3.2) (for vi = 1) and (3.3) (for vi = 0) for i = 1, 2, 3 and for all ti ∈ {0, 1}:
∑
t−i
p(t−i|ti; θ)
[
pω(1|~t; θ)− pii
] ∑
v−i∈Pi
µ(1, v−i|~t) ≥ 0 (3.2)
and ∑
t−i
p(t−i|ti; θ)
[
pii − pω(1|~t; θ)
] ∑
v−i∈Pi
µ(0, v−i|~t) ≥ 0, (3.3)
where pω(ω|~t; θ) denotes conditional probability mass function of ω given ~t. There are
therefore 12 such equilibrium conditions at the voting stage. For interpretation, note that
the conditions (3.2) can be written as∑
t−i
[Pr(ω = 1|t−i, ti; (q, ρ))− pii]
∑
v−i∈Pi
µ((1, v−i)|(ti, t−i)) Pr(t−i|ti; (q, ρ)) ≥ 0,
which provided
∑
t−i
∑
v−i∈Pi µ((1, v−i)|(ti, t−i)) Pr(t−i|ti; (q, ρ)) > 0, can be written as
Pr(ω = 1|vi = 1, ti, P ivi; (~q, ρ, µ)) ≥ pii.
That is, conditional on her vote vi, signal ti, and conditional on Piv
i, the event that i
is pivotal in the decision (given µ), i prefers to overturn the decision of the lower court.
Similarly conditions (3.3) boil down to Pr(ω = 1|vi = 0, ti, P ivi; (~q, ρ, µ)) ≤ pii.
Deliberation Stage. At the deliberation stage, communication equilibria require that
judges are willing to truthfully disclose their private information to the mediator, antici-
pating the outcomes induced by the equilibrium probability distributions µ(·|~t) over vote
profiles ~v. This includes ruling out deviations at the deliberation stage that are profitable
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when followed up by further deviations at the voting stage. To consider this possibility we
define the four “disobeying” strategies:
τ1(vi) = vi : always obey
τ2(vi) = 1− vi : always disobey
τ3(vi) = 1 : always overturn
τ4(vi) = 0 : always uphold
We require that for all i = 1, 2, 3, all ti ∈ {0, 1}, and τj(·), j = 1, 2, 3, 4:∑
t−i
p(t−i|ti; θ)
∑
v
[
ui(ψ(~v),~t)µ(~v|ti, t−i)− ui(ψ(τj(vi), v−i),~t)µ(~v|1− ti, t−i)
] ≥ 0 (3.4)
There are therefore 24 such equilibrium conditions at the deliberation stage.
For any given (θ, ~pi), the conditions (3.2),(3.3), and (3.4) characterize the set of communi-
cation equilibria M(θ, ~pi); i.e.,
M(θ, ~pi) = {µ ∈M : (θ, ~pi, µ) satisfies (3.2), (3.3) and (3.4)}, (3.5)
whereM is the set of all possible values that µ can take, and it can be conveniently thought
of as the set of 8*8 dimensional matrices whose elements lie in [0, 1] and each row sums to
one. Note that M(θ, ~pi) is convex, as it is defined by linear inequality constraints on µ.
Remark 3.1 (Robust Communication Equilibria). Note that for given vi, the vote profiles in
which the other judges vote unanimously to overturn or uphold do not enter the incentive
compatibility conditions at the voting stage. Thus, without any additional refinement, the
set of communication equilibria includes strategy profiles in which some members of the
court vote against their preferred alternative only because their vote cannot influence the
decision of the court. These include not only strategy profiles µ that put positive probability
only on unanimous votes, but also profiles in which i votes against her preferred alternative
only because conditional on her signal and her vote recommendation she is sure – believes
with probability one – that her vote is not decisive. Consider the example in Table 1.
The strategy profile in Table 1 is a communication equilibrium for ρ = 0.1, and pii =
0.3, qi = 0.6 for i = 1, 2, 3. However, judge 1 votes to overturn with positive probability
even if Pr(ω = 1|~t) < pi for all ~t. This in spite of the fact that non-unanimous vote profiles
are played with positive probability. However, conditional on t1 = 0 (columns 5 to 8) and
v1 = 1 (rows 1 to 4), judge 1 believes that either ~v = (1, 0, 0) or ~v = (1, 1, 1) are played. As
a result, her vote is not decisive in equilibrium, and 1 is willing to vote to overturn. The
same is true in this example conditional on t1 = 1. A similar logic holds for judges 2 and 3.
8
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Table 1: A Non-Robust Communication Equilibrium for ρ = 0.1 and pii = 0.3, qi = 0.6 for
i = 1, 2, 3.
Because these equilibria are not robust to small perturbations in individuals’ beliefs about
how others will behave, we rule them out. To do this, we require that each individual
best responds to beliefs that are consistent with small trembles (occurring with probability
η) on equilibrium play (so that all vote profiles have positive probability after any signal
profile). Formally, in all equilibrium conditions (at both the voting and deliberation stage)
we substitute Pr(~v|~t) in place of µ(~v|~t), where for any ~t and ~v,
Pr(~v|~t) =
∑
vˆ:vˆi=vi
µ(vˆ|~t)
∏
j 6=i
(1− η)vˆj=vjηvˆj 6=vj
The η we use in the empirical section is 0.000001. To evaluate the robustness of our
results, we replicate the analysis using two larger values of η: 0.001 and 0.01. This relaxes
significantly the consistency of equilibrium beliefs with equilibrium strategies. The results,
presented in Figure 10 in the appendix, show that our findings are qualitatively unchanged.
4 Data
The data are drawn together from two sources. The main source is the United States
Courts of Appeals Data Base (Songer (2008)). This provides detailed information about a
substantial sample of cases considered by courts of appeals between 1925 and 1996, including
characteristics of the cases, the judges hearing the case, and their votes. Among the roughly
16,000 cases in the full database, we restrict our attention to criminal cases, which make up
around 25% of the total. The case and judge-specific variables which we use in our analysis
are summarized in Table 5 in the Appendix. Additional information for judges involved
9
in these decisions was obtained from the Multi-User Data Base on the Attributes of U.S.
Appeals Court Judges (Zuk, Barrow, and Gryski (2009)).
Since we are modeling the voting behavior on appellate panels, we distinguish between
judges’ votes for upholding (v = 0) versus overturning (v = 1) the decision of a lower
court.9 Thus, given the majority voting rule, among the eight possible vote profiles, there
are four which lead to an outcome of upholding the lower court’s decision – (0, 0, 0), (1, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1) – and four leading to overturning – (1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0), (1, 0, 1) and (0, 1, 1).
For each case, we include a dummy variable (“FedLaw”) for whether the case is prosecuted
under federal (rather than state) law, as well as dummy variables for the crime in each case.
These crime categories are based on the nature of the criminal offense in the case, and do
not exhaust the set of possible crimes, but instead constitute “common” issues, bundling
a relatively large number of cases within each label. Thus “Aggravated” contains murder,
aggravated assault, and rape cases. “White Collar” crimes include tax fraud, and violations
of business regulations, etc. “Theft” includes robbery, burglary, auto theft, and larceny.
The “Narcotics” category encompasses all drug-related offenses.
In addition to the nature of the crime, we also include information about the major le-
gal issue under consideration in the appeal. In particular, we distinguish issues of Jury
Instruction, Sentencing, Admissibility and Sufficiency of evidence from other legal issues.
We also include three variables which describe the makeup of the judicial panel deciding
each case: an indicator for whether the panel is a Republican majority (“Rep. Majority”),
whether the panel contains at least one woman (“Woman on panel”), and whether there
is a majority of Harvard and/or Yale Law School graduates on the panel (“Harvard-Yale
Majority”). This latter variable is included to capture possible “club effects” in voting
behavior; the previous literature has pointed out how graduates from similar program may
share common judicial views, and vote as a bloc.
Finally, we include four judge-specific covariates. “Republican” indicates a judge’s affiliation
to the Republican Party. “Yearsexp” measures the number of years that a judge has served
on the court of appeals, at the time that he/she decides a particular case (this variable
varies both across judges and across cases). “Judexp” and “Polexp” measure the number
of years of, respecitvely, judicial and political experience which a judge had prior to his/her
appointment to the appellate court.
Judges are assigned to cases on an effectively random basis. The particular assignment pro-
9Courts of appeal in the US do not determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, but only assess
whether or not errors have been committed at trial. Their decisions are based on the record of the case
established by the trial court, and do not consider additional evidence or hear witnesses.
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cedures vary from circuit to circuit, with some circuits using explicitly random assignments
(via random number generators) and others incorporating additional factors as dictated by
practical considerations (e.g., availability). This semi-random nature of panel assignment
means that the parties in each case have little influence over the particular makeup of the
panel which hears their case; this minimizes “case selection” problems which may otherwise
confound the interpretation of the estimation results.10
5 Econometric Model
5.1 Partial identification of model parameters
The immediate goal of the estimation is to recover the signal/state distribution parameters,
θ, and the judges’ preference vector ~pi. The information used to recover these parameters
is the distribution of the voting profiles, pv(~v), which can be identified from the data. Here
we define the sharp identified set for the model parameters.11 The sharp identified set of
{θ, ~pi} is the set of parameters that can rationalize pv(~v) under some equilibrium selection
mechanism λ – a mixing distribution over µ ∈M(θ, ~pi). In other words, the sharp identified
set A0 is the set of (θ, ~pi) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]3 such that there exists a λ that satisfies
pv(~v) =
∫
µ∈M(θ,~pi)
λ(µ)
∑
~t
µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ)dλ. (5.1)
However, because the set M(θ, ~pi) of communication equilibria is convex, whenever there
exists a mixture λ satisfying (5.1) there exists a single equilibrium µ ∈ M(θ, ~pi) such that
pv(~v) =
∑
~t µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ).12 Thus A0 boils down to
A0 = {(θ, ~pi) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]3 : ∃µ ∈M(θ, ~pi) s.t. pv(~v) =
∑
~t
µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ)}. (5.2)
10See Iaryczower and Shum’s (2012b) study of US Supreme Court voting behavior for a more extended
discussion and assessment of case selection.
11The sharpness of the identified set is in the sense of Berry and Tamer (2006), Galichon and Henry (2011),
Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2011). However, our estimation approach differs quite substantially
from those papers.
12 This fact implies an observational equivalence between a unique communication equilibrium being played
in the data, versus a mixture of such equilibria. Sweeting (2009) and De Paula and Tang (2012) discuss
the non-observational equivalence between mixture of equilibria and a unique mixed strategy equilibria in
coordination games. One difference is that communication equilibria induce correlated actions, whereas
mixed-strategy equilibria induce independent actions.
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We will also introduce the following set B0:
B0 = {(θ, ~pi, µ) ∈ B : µ ∈M(θ, ~pi) and pv(~v) =
∑
~t
µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ)}, (5.3)
where B = Θ × [0, 1]3 × M and M is the set of µ – 64×64 dimensional matrices, the
elements of which are positive and each row sums to 1. The set B0 is the sharp identified
set of {θ, ~pi, µ}, where µ is the true mixture voting assignment probability. The identified set
A0 can be considered as the projection of B0 onto its first dθ + 3 dimensions, corresponding
to the parameters (θ, ~pi).
Identification in a Symmetric Model: Intuition. Before proceeding on to the esti-
mation of the identified set, we provide some intuition for the identification of the model
parameters by analyzing a stripped-down model in which the three judges are symmetric, in
the sense that they have identical preferences and quality of information. That is, the bias
parameters are identical across judges (pi1 = pi2 = pi3 = pi) and so are the signal accuracies
(q1 = q2 = q3 = q). In this simple model, there are only three parameters (ρ, q, pi).
In Figure 1 we show the pairs (pi, q) in the identified set for four different vote profile
vectors and given values of the common prior ρ. The figure on the upper left panel plots
the identified set for ρ = 0.5, and a uniform distribution of vote profiles, i.e., pv(~v) = 1/8 for
all ~v. Because of the symmetry of the vote profile and the characteristics of the individuals,
the identified set is also symmetric. Moreover, the set of biases pi in the identified set for
each value of q is increasing in q. Thus, low ability judges must be moderate if they are
to be consistent with the “data”, but high ability judges can be very biased towards either
upholding or overturning and still play a mixture of equilibria consistent with the data.
The figure on the top right plots the pairs (pi, q) in the identified set for the uniform distri-
bution over vote profiles and ρ = 0.1. In this case the public information incorporated in
the prior is very favorable towards upholding the decision of the lower court. As a result,
only judges that are very biased towards overturning can vote in a way consistent with the
uniform distribution of the voting profile. The figures in the lower panel return to ρ = 0.5,
but consider non-uniform distributions of vote profiles. In the lower-left figure only unani-
mous votes have positive probability, and the probability of overturning is pv(1, 1, 1) = 0.9,
while pv(0, 0, 0) = 0.1. As in the first figure, low ability judges must be moderate if they
are to be consistent with the “data”, but high ability judges must be biased towards over-
turning, and increasingly so the higher the information precision. The same result holds in
the lower right figure, where also overturning is more likely, but only non-unanimous votes
have positive probability. In this case, however, more moderate judges are consistent with
12
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~v : split majority to overturn: pv(~v) = 1/4
~v : split majority to uphold: pv(~v) = 1/12
ρ = 0.5
Figure 1: Identification of Second-Stage Parameters: A Simplified Model: qi = q for all i,
pii = pi for all i. X-axis: q (probability of correct signal); Y-axis: pi (judges’ bias parameter)
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the data for any given level of q.
5.2 Estimation
To study the estimation of the identified set, we define the criterion function
Q(θ, ~pi;W ) = min
µ∈M(θ,~pi)
Q(θ, ~pi, µ;W ) where
Q(θ, ~pi, µ,W ) = (~pv − Pt(θ)~µ)′W (~pv − Pt(θ)~µ)′ , (5.4)
and where ~pv = (pv(111), pv(110), pv(101), pv(100), pv(010), pv(001), pv(000))
′
, ~µ is a 64−vector
whose 8k + 1’th to 8k + 8’th coordinates are the (k + 1)’th row of µ(~v|~t) for k = 0, ..., 7,
Pt(θ) = p(~t, θ)
′ ⊗ [I7|07] and W is a positive definite weighting matrix specified later.
The profile of vote probabilities pv(~v) is unknown, but can be estimated by the empirical
frequencies of the vote profiles:
pˆv(~v) =
1
n
n∑
l=1
1(Vl = ~v), (5.5)
where Vl is the observed voting profile for case l and n is the sample size. Assuming that
the cases are i.i.d., by the law of large numbers, pˆv(~v) →p pv(~v) for all ~v ∈ V, where
V = {111, 110, 101, 100, 011, 010, 001}. One can define a sample analogue estimator for A0:
Aˆn = {(θ, ~pi) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]3 : Qn(θ, ~pi,Wn) = min
(θ,~pi)∈Θ×[0,1]3
Qn(θ, ~pi,Wn)}, (5.6)
where Wn is an estimator of W and Qn is defined like Q except with ~pv replaced by its
sample analogue ~ˆpv.
The following theorem establishes the consistency of Aˆn with respect to the Hausdorff
distance:
dH(Aˆn,A0) = max
{
sup
(θ,~pi)∈Aˆn
inf
(θ∗,~pi∗)∈A0
||(θ, ~pi)− (θ∗, ~pi∗)||, sup
(θ∗,~pi∗)∈A0
inf
(θ,~pi)∈Aˆn
||(θ, ~pi)− (θ∗, ~pi∗)||
}
.
(5.7)
In general partially identified models, the sample analogue estimators for the identified sets
typically are not consistent with respect to the Hausdorff distance. See e.g. Chernozhukov,
Hong, and Tamer (2007). Our problem has a special structure that guarantees consistency
under mild conditions.
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Theorem 1. Suppose that Wn →p W for some finite positive definite matrix W and Θ is
compact. Also suppose that cl(int(B) ∩ B0) = B0.13 Then, dH(Aˆn,A0)→p 0 as the sample
size n goes to infinity.
Proof. Because p(~t, θ) = p(~t|w = 1; θ)ρ + p(~t|w = 0; θ)(1− ρ) is continuously differentiable
in θ, Theorem 2.1 of Shi and Shum (2012) applies and shows that dH(Bˆ,B0)→p 0, where
Bˆn = {(θ, ~pi, ~µ) ∈ B : Qn(θ, ~pi, µ;Wn) = min
(θ,~pi)∈Θ×[0,1]3
Qn(θ, ~pi,Wn)}, (5.8)
where Qn(θ, ~pi, µ;Wn) is defined like Q(θ, ~pi, µ;W ) but with ~p and W replaced by ~ˆp and
Wn. Because Aˆn and A0 are the projections of Bˆn and B0 onto their first dθ + 3 dimension,
respectively, we have dH(Aˆn,A0)→p 0.
5.3 Confidence Set
Next, we discuss statistical inference in partially identified models based on confidence sets
which cover either the true parameter, or the identified set with a prespecified probability.
Following the literature, we construct a confidence set by inverting a test for the null
hypothesis H0 : (θ, ~pi) ∈ A0 for each fixed (θ, ~pi). To be specific, we collect all the (θ, ~pi)
such that there is one µ ∈M(θ, ~pi) at which the H0 is accepted. The collection of all those
(θ, ~pi) forms a confidence set.14
Next, we define the test statistic used in the test which we will invert. Standard applica-
tion of the central limit theorem gives us
√
n(~ˆpv − ~pv) →d N(0,Σ), where Σ denote the
variance matrix of (1(Vl = 111), 1(Vl = 110), 1(Vl = 101), 1(Vl = 100), 1(Vl = 011), 1(Vl =
010), 1(Vl = 001))
′
. Let Σˆn be the sample analogue estimator of Σ. Then the law of large
number implies Σˆn →p Σ.
Accordingly, we define the following test statistic:
Tn(θ, ~pi) = nQn(θ, ~pi; Σˆ
−1
n ). (5.9)
By definition, Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ nQn(θ, ~pi, µ; Σˆ−1n ) for any (θ, ~pi, µ) ∈ B0. Using standard argu-
13This is a weak assumption that is satisfied if each point in B0 is either in the interior of B or is a limit
point of a sequence in the interior of B. Unlike seemingly similar assumptions in the literature, it does not
require the identified set B0 to have nonempty interior. In this paper, numerical calculation of the identified
sets for different values of ~pv shows that this assumption holds.
14This inferential method differs from the approach of Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2009), which is based
on moment inequalities derived from agents’ best-response correspondences. While this approach has proved
useful in several applications with games of complete information, in the context of our incomplete informa-
tion environment we have not been able to derive moment inequalities based on best-response behavior.
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ments, we can show that for any (θ, ~pi, µ) ∈ B0, nQn(θ, ~pi, µ, Σˆ−1n ) →d χ2(7). Thus, a test
of significance level α ∈ (0, 1) can use the 1 − α quantile of χ2(7) as critical value. The
confidence set for (θ, ~pi) is defined as
CSn(1− α) = {(θ, ~pi) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]3 : Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ χ27,α}, (5.10)
where χ27,α is the 1− α quantile of χ2(7).
Theorem 2. Suppose Σ is invertible. Then
(a) lim infn→∞ inf(θ,~pi)∈A0 Pr((θ, ~pi) ∈ CSn(1− α)) ≥ 1− α; and
(b) lim infn→∞ Pr(A0 ⊆ CSn(1− α)) ≥ 1− α.
Proof. (a) For any sequence {(θn, ~pin) ∈ A0}∞n=1, there exists {µn ∈ M(θn, ~pin)}∞n=1 such
that ~pv = Pt(θn)~µn. Thus, nQn(θn, ~pin, µn; Σˆ
−1
n ) = n(~ˆpv−~pv)
′
Σˆ−1n (~ˆpv−~pv)→d X 2(7). Thus
Pr((θn, ~pin) ∈ CSn(1− α)) = Pr(Tn(θn, ~pin) ≤ χ27,α)
≥Pr(nQn(θn, ~pin, µn; Σˆ−1n ) ≤ χ27,α)
→Pr(χ2(7) ≤ χ27,α) = 1− α. (5.11)
This implies part (a).
(b) Part (b) holds because
Pr(A0 ⊆ CSn(1− α)) = Pr( sup
(θ,~pi)∈A0
Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ χ27,α)
≥ Pr( sup
(θ,~pi,µ)∈B0
nQn(θ, ~pi, µ; Σˆ
−1
n ) ≤ χ27,α)
= Pr(n(~ˆpv − ~pv)′Σˆ−1n (~ˆpv − ~pv) ≤ χ27,α)
→ Pr(χ2(7) ≤ χ27,α) = 1− α, (5.12)
where the second equality holds because for all (θ, ~pi, µ) ∈ B0, ~pv = Pt(θ)~µ.
Remark 5.1. Part (a) shows that CSn covers the true value of (θ, ~pi) with asymptotic prob-
ability no smaller than 1− α. Interestingly, it is also a confidence set that covers A0 with
asymptotic probability no smaller than 1−α, as shown in part (b).15 The intuition for this
phenomenon is that the random components of Tn(θ, ~pi, µ) – which are just the empirical
frequencies of the vote probabilities ~ˆp – do not depend on the model parameters (θ, pi). Be-
cause of this, the second-stage confidence sets for (θ, pi) are obtained by the random elements
in ~ˆp, by a (loosely-speaking) partially-identified analog of the Delta method. In contrast, in
15 Imbens and Manski (2004) initiated a sizable literature regarding these two types of confidence sets.
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typicall moment inequality models, the random sample moment functions depend explicitly
on the model parameters.
Remark 5.2. Because the confidence set CSn above is based on the asymptotic critical value
for nQn(θ, ~pi, µ; Σˆ
−1
n ), which is weakly bigger than Tn(θ, ~pi), it may over-cover asymptoti-
cally; that is, it may be larger than necessary. Tighter and nonconservative confidence sets
can be constructed by directly approximating the distribution of Tn(θ, ~pi) using the meth-
ods developed in Bugni, Canay, and Shi (2011) and Kitamura and Stoye (2011).16 The
disadvantage of doing this is two-fold: (i) the critical value will need to be simulated and
will depend on θ and ~pi and (ii) a tuning parameter will need to be introduced to reflect the
slackness of the inequality constraints. In addition, in our data, we find that the confidence
set CSn is not much larger than the estimated set Aˆn, suggesting that not much can be
gained by adopting the more complicated methods.
The confidence set can be computed in the following steps:
(1) for each (θ, ~pi), compute Tn(θ, ~pi) = nQn(θ, ~pi; Σˆ
−1
n ) by solving the quadratic program-
ming problem:
Qn(θ, ~pi;Wn) = min
~µ∈[0,1]64
(~pv − Pt(θ)~µ)′W (~pv − Pt(θ)~µ)′
s.t.(3.2), (3.3), (3.4), and
k+8∑
j=k+1
~µj = 1, k = 0, ..., 7. (5.13)
(2) repeat step (1) for many grid points of (θ, ~pi) ∈ Θ× [0, 1]3, and
(3) collect the points in step (2) that satisfy Tn(θ, ~pi) ≤ χ27,α and the points form CSn(1−α).
For all the results in this paper, we use a value of α = 0.05.
5.4 Handling Covariates – Two-step Estimation
Here we describe a two-step estimation approach for this model, which resembles the two-
step procedure in Iaryczower and Shum (2012b). This is a simple and effective way to
deal with a large number of covariates. Throughout, we let Xt denote the set of covariates
associated with case t, including the characteristics of the judges who are hearing case t.
16 See Wolak (1989) for the case where the inequality constraints are linear in the structural parameters
θ.
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In the first step, we estimate a flexible “reduced-form” model for the vote probabilities
pv(~v|X).17 Specifically, we parameterize the probabilities of the eight feasible vote profiles
using an 8-choice multinomial logit model. Letting i index the eight vote profiles, we have
pv(vi|X;β) = exp(X
′
iβi)
1 +
∑7
i′=1 exp(Xi′βi′)
, i = 1, . . . , 7;
pv(v8|X;β) = 1
1 +
∑7
i′=1 exp(Xi′βi′)
,
(5.14)
where v1, ..., v7 are the 7 elements in V and v8 = 1 −
∑7
i=1 v7.
18 Because the labeling
of the three judges is arbitrary, it makes sense to impose an exchangeability requirement
on our model of vote probabilities. In particular, the conditional probability of a vote
profile (v1, v2, v3) given case characteristics X and judge covariates (Z1, Z2, Z3) should be
invariant to permutations of the ordering of the three judges; i.e., the vote probability
P (v1, v2, v3|X,Z1, Z2, Z3) should be exchangeable in (v1, Z1), (v2, Z2) and (v3, Z3), for all
X. These exchangeability conditions imply restrictions on the coefficients on (X,Z1, Z2, Z3)
in the logit choice probabilities.19
Given the first-stage parameter estimates βˆ =
(
βˆ1, . . . , βˆ7
)′
, we obtain estimated vote
probabilities pˆ =
(
p(v1|X; βˆ), . . . , p(v7|X; βˆ)
)′
. In the second stage, we use the estimated
voting probability vector pˆ to estimate the identified set of the model parameters (θ, ~pi)
using arguments from the previous section. This estimation procedure allows the underlying
model parameters (θ, ~pi) to depend quite flexibly on X. The voting assignment µ is allowed
to depend on X arbitrarily, µ(~v|~t,X).
Both the estimation and the inference procedure described in the previous section can
be used for each fixed value of X = x in exactly the same way, only with pˆv(~v), ~ˆpv,
pv(~v) and ~pv replaced by pv(~v|x, βˆ), ~pv(x, βˆ), pv(~v|x, β) and ~pv(x, β), (θ, ~pi, µ) replaced by
(θ(x), ~pi(x), µ(·|·;x)) and Σˆn replaced by Σˆn(x) = (∂~pv(x, βˆ)/∂β′)Σˆβ(∂~pv(x, βˆ)/∂β), where
Σˆβ is a consistent estimator of the asymptotic variance of
√
n(βˆ−β), which can be obtained
from the first stage. The consistency and the coverage probability theory go through as
17This approach is commonplace in recent empirical applications of auction and dynamic game models
(see for example Ryan (2012), and Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006)).
18By using a parametrization of the conditional vote probabilities P (v|X) that is continuous in X, we
are also implicitly assuming that the equilibrium selection process is also continuous in X. Note that such
an assumption is not needed if we estimate P (v|X) nonparametrically and impose no smoothness of these
probabilities in X.
19In particular, symmetry implies the following constraints: (i) β1,111 = β2,111 = β3,111, (ii) β1,011 =
β2,101 = β3,110, (iii) β1,100 = β2,010 = β3,001, (iv) β2,011 = β3,011 = β1,101 = β3,101 = β1,110 = β2,110, (v)
β2,100 = β3,100 = β1,010 = β3,010 = β1,001 = β2,001, (vi) γ011 = γ110 = γ101, and (vii) γ001 = γ100 = γ010. See
also Menzel (2011) for a related discussion about the importance of exchangeability restrictions in Bayesian
inference of partially identified models.
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long as βˆ is consistent and asymptotically normal and (∂~pv(x, β)/∂β
′
)Σβ(∂~pv(x, β)/∂β)
is invertible, where Σβ is the asymptotic variance of
√
n(βˆ − β). This assumption holds
automatically in the logit case described above as long as Σβ is invertible.
6 Results
6.1 First-Stage Estimates
The results from the first-stage estimation are given in Table 2. Since these are “reduced-
form” vote probabilities, these coefficients should not be interpreted in any causal manner,
but rather summarizing the correlation patterns in the data.
Nevertheless, some interesting patterns emerge. First, vote outcomes differ significantly
depending on the type of crime considered in each case (cases involving aggravated assault,
white collar crimes and theft are significantly less likely to be overturned in a divided decision
than other cases) and in response to differences in legal issues (cases involving problems with
jury instruction or sentencing in the lower courts are on average less likely to be overturned
in a divided decision, while cases involving issues of sufficiency and admissibility of evidence
are less likely to be overturned in unanimous decisions).
Vote outcomes also change with the partisan composition of the court. A republican judge
is less likely to be in the majority of a divided decision to overturn (less so in assault and
white collar cases) and more likely to be in the majority of a divided decision to uphold
the decision of the lower court. At the same time, cases considered by courts composed of
a majority of republican judges on average have a significantly higher probability of being
overturned in both unanimous and divided decisions. The first result indicates that this is
due to the voting behavior of the democrat judge when facing a republican majority.
Finally, vote outcomes also differ based on judges’ judicial and political experience. Judges
with more judicial and political experience, or with more years of experience in the court,
are less likely to be in the majority of a divided decision to overturn. Neither having a
female judge on the panel, or a majority of graduates from Harvard or Yale Law schools (a
possible club effect) are significantly related to vote outcomes.
6.2 Second-Stage Estimates: Preferences and Information
In the second stage of the estimation, we use the estimated voting probability vector pˆ =
p(~v|X; βˆ) to estimate the identified set of the model parameters (θ, ~pi).
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Admissibility
Sufficiency
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Table 2: First-stage estimates, from a multinomial logit model (baseline vote profile (0,0,0))
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To present the results, we fix benchmark case and judge characteristics, and later on in-
troduce comparative statics from this benchmark. For our benchmark case we consider a
white collar crime prosecuted under federal law, in which the major legal issue for appeal
is admissibility of evidence. Judges 1 and 2 are Republican, and judge 3 is a Democrat (so
that the majority of the court is Republican). All three judges are male, and at most one
of the judges has a law degree from Harvard or Yale.
The three benchmark judges differ in their years of court experience, as well as prior judicial
and political experience. See Table 6 in the Appendix for the full benchmark specification.
6.2.1 The Symmetric (ρ, q, pi) Model
We begin by analyzing the symmetric model introduced in Section 5.1. In the symmetric
model, the bias parameters and signal accuracies are assumed to be identical across judges.
As a result, the model has only three parameters (ρ, q, pi).
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Figure 2: 95% Confidence set, for symmetric justices model. X-axis: q (probability of
correct signal); Y-axis: pi (judges’ bias parameter). Computed at benchmark values of co-
variates (predicted vote profile probabilities are pˆv(111) = 0.212; pˆv(101) = 0.019; pˆv(110) =
0.008; pˆv(011) = 0.009; pˆv(100) = 0.019; pˆv(010) = 0.014; pˆv(001) = 0.019; pˆv(000) = 0.700).
Green dots: estimates of identified set (using Eq. (5.8)). Blue dots: 95% confidence set.
The left panel in Figure 2 plots the pairs (pi, q) in the identified set for ρ = 0.5. Because the
distribution of vote profiles is asymmetric in favor of upholding the decision of the lower
court, the identified set for ρ = 0.5 is asymmetric towards larger values of pi (particularly
for low competence levels, q), indicating a preference towards upholding the decision of the
lower courts. But while the distribution of vote profiles is highly asymmetric in favor of
21
upholding, the identified set for ρ = 0.5 is only mildly asymmetric, and not qualitatively
different than the set we obtained for the uniform distribution over vote profiles in section
5.1. Moreover, as in that case, the range of biases pi that are consistent with the data for
a given value of q is increasing in q. Thus, low ability judges must be moderate if they
are to be consistent with the data, but high ability judges can be heavily biased towards
upholding or overturning and still play a mixture of equilibria consistent with the data.20
To evaluate the range of possible equilibrium outcomes under deliberation, we compute
the probability that the court reaches an incorrect decision for every point (θ, ~pi) in the
confidence set. Because of the multiplicity of equilibria, for each such point (θ, ~pi) there is
a set of communication equilibria M(θ, ~pi), with each µ ∈ M(θ, ~pi) being associated with a
certain probability of error
ε(µ, (θ, ~pi)) = (1− ρ)εI(µ, (θ, ~pi)) + ρεII(µ, (θ, ~pi)).
Here εI(µ, (θ, ~pi)) = Pr(v = 1|ω = 0) =
∑
~t
∑
~v:v=1 µ(~v|~t)p(~t|w = 0) denotes the type-I error
(overturn when should not) in the equilibrium µ, given (θ, ~pi), and εII(µ, (θ, ~pi)) = Pr(v =
0|ω = 1) = ∑~t∑~v:v=1 µ(~v|~t)p(~t|w = 1) is the type-II error (fail to overturn when it should)
in the equilibrium µ, given (θ, ~pi). Note that both the type-I error and the type-II error are
functions of the model parameters µ, θ, ~pi, and inference on them amounts to projecting the
confidence set of the model parameters onto the range of these functions.
We consider two objects of interest, in order to address two conceptually distinct questions.
First is the maximum and minimum error probabilities across all possible equilibria, for all
parameter values in the confidence set. For each point in the confidence set, define
ε(θ, ~pi) ≡ max
µ∈M(θ,~pi)
ε(µ, (θ, ~pi)), and ε(θ, ~pi) ≡ min
µ∈M(θ,~pi)
ε(µ, (θ, ~pi)).
Second is the maximum and minimum error probabilities across equilibria that are consistent
with the observed data ~pv. For each point (θ, ~pi) in the confidence set, and data ~pv, we define
ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) = max
µ∈M(θ,~pi)
ε(µ, (θ, ~pi)) s.t. pv(~v) = ∑
~t
µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ)

20The right panel of Figure 2 plots the pairs (pi, q) in the identified set for ρ = 0.2, which is approximately
the sample probability that a case is overturned for the benchmark specification. In this case the public
information incorporated in the prior favors upholding the decision of the lower court. As a result, when
private signals are not too informative, only judges that are relatively biased towards upholding can vote in
a way consistent with the data. However, as with ρ = 0.5, high ability judges can have relatively extreme
preferences for overturning or upholding and still play a mixture of equilibria consistent with the data.
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and similarly for ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv).21
The first object gives us the safest bounds on what could happen, for any equilibrium
selection rule, including both mixtures of equilibria that are consistent with the observed
data and others that are not. The second objects tells us what did happen in our data.
The upper left and lower left panels of Figure 3 present the minimum and maximum equi-
librium errors across all equilibria in the symmetric (q, pi, ρ) model. The figures plot ε(θ, ~pi)
and ε(θ, ~pi) for all combinations of q and pi in the confidence set, fixing ρ = 0.5. Consider
first ε(θ, ~pi) in the upper-left panel. For low quality of information, as we saw, only moderate
judges are consistent with the data (Figure 2). With higher quality of information, the set
of biases consistent with the data expands, so that courts with significant heterogeneity are
consistent with the data. Nevertheless, the minimum error ε(θ, ~pi) falls with the competence
of the court, and goes to zero as q → 1, even when judges have extreme biases.
The bottom-left panel presents the upper bound of the equilibrium probability of error
ε(ρ, q, pi) for points in the confidence set. This worst case measure illustrates the flip side of
deliberation: the maximum equilibrium error with communication actually increases with
the precision of judges’ private information, and goes to one for q → 1, independently of the
direction and level of justices’ bias. Thus, courts composed of highly competent judges can
produce wrong decisions very frequently after deliberating. As we argue below, the reason
for this inefficiency is that best responses in a game with deliberation are very sensitive to
agents’ expectations of how other individuals will communicate. And because judges care
directly about the content of each others’ messages, the effect of these beliefs is larger the
more valuable is the information held by other members of the court.
The upper right and lower right panels of Figure 3 plot the minimum and maximum prob-
ability of error for equilibria consistent with the data, ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) and ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv). Specifi-
cally, the figures show the maximum and minimum error probability in equilibria matching
voting profile distributions that are in the 95% confidence set of the “true” voting profile
distribution. Thus, while the figures on the left panel provide the bounds of the 95% confi-
dence interval of the potential error probability, the figures on the right panel plot the 95%
confidence interval of the true error probability.
21Because M(θ, ~pi) is a convex set and the constraint pv(~v) =
∑
~t µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ) is linear in µ, µ can be
replaced with a linear combination of elements in M(θ, ~pi) without affecting the value of ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) or
ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv). Therefore, when considering equilibria consistent with the data, we are not assuming that the
same equilibrium is played in every case.”
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Although the results are qualitatively similar to the unconstrained max and min error
probabilities, the upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium errors tighten significantly.
In particular, the lower bound of ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) in the confidence set, which is attained for
high levels of q, increases from close to zero in the unconstrained case to about 25% for
equilibria consistent with the data. It follows that if we focus on mixtures of equilibria that
are consistent with the data, then for any possible configuration of bias and competence
in the confidence set the court chooses incorrectly at least one fourth of the time. Thus,
although in the best case scenario deliberation can reduce mistakes to almost zero when
courts are competent, these potential gains are far from being realized given the selection
of equilibria that is consistent with the data.
6.2.2 Heterogeneous Preferences: The (ρ, q, ~pi) Model
The previous model suppressed heterogeneity in preferences. However, it is possible that this
heterogeneity is precisely what leads to better outcomes, raising the level of deliberation
by bringing together different points of view. We now extend the analysis to allow for
heterogeneous preferences. Here each judge i is allowed an idiosyncratic bias pii. The model
is then characterized by a vector (ρ, q, pi1, pi2, pi3). Figure 4 plots the set of ~pi in the confidence
set for different values of the prior, ρ, and precision of private information, q.
The results for the confidence set with heterogeneous preferences extend naturally the results
of Figure 2 for the symmetric model: while low competence judges must be homogeneous
and relatively moderate in order to be consistent with the data, competent judges can
be highly heterogeneous and still generate a distribution of vote profiles consistent with
the data. This result is interesting because it implies that deliberation can allow high
ability judges to surpass initial differences of opinion. A distinctive feature of decisions in
the courts of appeals is the large proportion of cases decided unanimously. This fact is
commonly interpreted in the literature as indicating that either judges were like-minded
from the outset, or that they have an intrinsic desire to compromise (see for example
Fischman (2007)). Our results suggest an alternative interpretation. High unanimity rates
do not imply common interests at an ex ante stage. Instead, deliberation among competent
judges can generate the high frequency of unanimous votes observed in the data, without
requiring auxiliary motives such as the desire of judges to compromise, or to put forward a
“unified” stance in each case.
As in the case of the symmetric (ρ, q, pi) model, we can also compute here the maximum and
minimum error probabilities across all equilibria, ε(θ, ~pi) and ε(θ, ~pi) and across equilibria
consistent with the data, ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) and ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) for each point in the confidence set.
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Figure 4: Hyperplanes of confidence set, for heterogeneous preferences model. (pi1, pi2, pi3)
on (x, y, z)-axis. Green dots: estimates of identified set (using Eq. (5.8)). Red dots: 95%
confidence set.
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To reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we introduce a measure of polarization of the
court,
P =
∑
i∈N
∑
j 6=i
(pii − pij)2.
Polarization increases as judges’ bias parameters are farther apart from one another, reach-
ing a theoretical maximum of two, and decreases as judges’ preferences are closer to each
other’s, reaching a minimum of zero when all judges have the same preferences.
The upper-left and lower-left panels of Figure 5 present the minimum and maximum equi-
librium errors across all equilibria in the heterogeneous model. The figures plot ε(θ, ~pi) and
ε(θ, ~pi) for all combinations of competence (q) and polarization (P ) consistent with points
(θ, ~pi) in the confidence set, for ρ = 0.5.
The results in the generalized model are a natural extension of the results for the symmetric
model. For low q, only very homogeneous courts, composed entirely of moderate judges, are
consistent with the data. These courts are highly inaccurate, even after pooling information,
and correspondingly make wrong decisions very often (about half of the time in the limit as
q → 1/2). As ability increases, however, more polarized courts can be consistent with the
data. These more polarized, but more able courts are capable of producing decisions that
have few errors. In fact, the minimum equilibrium error probability (in the top-left panel)
decreases with q, and goes to zero as q → 1, even when judges are very heterogeneous. On the
other hand, more able courts are also capable of producing wrong decisions very frequently.
The bottom-left panel presents the maximum equilibrium probability of error ε(ρ, q, pi) for
points in the confidence set. As in the symmetric model, the maximum equilibrium error
with communication is attained when the precision of judges’ private information is large
(and goes to above 90% for q → 1).
The fact that courts composed of competent judges can produce such frequent errors after
deliberating shows the fragility of outcomes to the multiple beliefs that judges can have in
equilibrium about how other judges will share, interpret and use information. To see this
in more detail, consider the “bad” equilibrium presented in Table 3. In the model, judges’
beliefs about how others will communicate are built into the equilibrium strategy µ(·|~t).
Table 3 presents a particularly inefficient equilibrium for q = 0.98 and ~pi = (0.20, 0.95, 0.50).
Here the court overturns almost always when it should uphold, and upholds when it should
overturn. This requires judges to go against their own private information.
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q = 0.98, ~pi = (0.20, 0.95, 0.50)
Table 3: An Example of a Communication Equilibrium in which highly competent judges
make mistakes with high probability after deliberating.
To understand why this is possible, consider the problem of judge 1 after receiving a signal
t1 = 1. In equilibrium, judge 1 votes to uphold (vi = 0) with positive probability. Given µ,
this is indeed a best response to her post-deliberation beliefs about whether the decision of
the lower court should be overturned. Because t1 = 1, judge 1 can exclude (put probability
zero on) the last four columns in the table. Similarly, because v1 = 0, judge 1 can similarly
exclude the first four rows in the table. Moreover, because judge 1 is not pivotal when
both of the other judges vote to uphold (row 5) or when both of the other judges vote to
overturn (row 8), these events are not payoff relevant. We are thus left with rows 6 and 7
and columns 1 to 4. But given this, judge 1 is almost sure that ~t = (1, 0, 0); i.e., that the
two other judges received information favoring upholding the decision of the lower court.
These two signals overwhelm her own information, and, given q ≈ 1, also her prior belief
and bias. As a result, judge 1 is willing to vote to uphold the decision of the lower court,
against her private information. A similar logic holds for judges 2 and 3.22
The general point that this example illustrates is that deliberation across rational actors
opens a wide array of beliefs that are consistent with equilibrium behavior. With common
values, this allows committee members to form inferences about the information dissemi-
nated across the committee that can sustain wildly inefficient outcomes.
22As Table 3 illustrates, implementing bad outcomes might require equilibria that seem in some sense
fragile. These equilibria, however, are robust to perturbations of beliefs around equilibrium play in the sense
of remark 3.1. In particular, we require that each individual best-responds to beliefs that are consistent
with small trembles (occurring with probability η = 0.000001) on equilibrium play. Increasing the value of η
(relaxing further the consistency of equilibrium beliefs with equilibrium strategies) eliminates some of these
fragile equilibria, but does not change the nature of the results (see Figure 12 in the Appendix).
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The previous results are relevant as a measure of the range of outcomes that could be realized
for any equilibrium selection, including both mixtures of equilibria that are consistent with
the observed data, and others that are not. The upper right and lower right panels of Figure
5 plot the minimum and maximum probability of error for equilibria consistent with the
data, ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) and ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv).
As in the symmetric model, the error bounds in equilibria consistent with the data are
qualitatively similar to the corresponding bounds across all equilibria. There is, however, a
significant difference in the levels. This is shown in Figure 6, which plots the percentiles for
maximum and minimum errors for all equilibria, and equilibria consistent with the data,
across all points in the 95% confidence set. Note that while ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv(~v)) ≤ 30% for 85%
of the points in the CS, on the other hand ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv(~v)) ≥ 9% for 90% of the points in
the CS, and ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv(~v)) ≥ 20% for 80% of the points in the CS. As we argued in the
context of the symmetric model, although in the best case scenario deliberation can reduce
mistakes to almost zero when courts are competent, these potential gains are far from being
realized given the selection of equilibria that is consistent with the data.
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Figure 6: Solid (dashed) lines plot the percentiles for maximum and minimum errors for all
equilibria (equilibria consistent with the data) across all points in the 95% confidence set.
Comparative Statics. In the discussion above, we have focused on the benchmark case
and court characteristics. It should be clear, however, that both the confidence set and the
set of equilibrium outcomes for each point in the confidence set are functions of the observ-
able characteristics that enter the first stage multinomial logit model. Thus, proceeding
as above, we can quantify the changes in types and outcomes associated with alternative
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configurations of the cases under consideration or the judges integrating the court.
To illustrate this, we evaluate the effect of switching judge 2’s party from Republican to
Democrat, keeping all else equal. Changing from the benchmark “RRD” partisan configura-
tion of the court to the alternative “RDD” partisan configuration has two noticeable effect
on the predicted probability of different vote outcomes. First, each vote profile overturn-
ing the decision of the lower court has a lower probability under a democratic-controlled
court than under a republican-controlled court. In particular, pˆv(000) changes from 0.677
to 0.636, and pˆv(111) from 0.223 to 0.234. Second, democratic-controlled courts tend to
generate more divided decisions than republican-controlled courts. Relative to republican-
controlled courts, democratic-controlled courts put a relatively large probability on divided
decisions overturning the decision of the lower court (now pˆv(101) = 0.030, pˆv(110) = 0.035,
and pˆv(011) = 0.027, while pˆv(100) = 0.015, pˆv(010) = 0.011, and pˆv(001) = 0.011).
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Figure 7: Difference in 95% Confidence Set from switching judge 2 from Republican to
Democrat (RRD to RDD). Red crosses: in confidence set for RDD but not RRD specifica-
tion; green dots: in confidence set for RRD but not RDD specification.
Figure 7 illustrates the change in the confidence set, for two given levels of q, and ρ = 1/2.
The figure shows that the RDD partisan configuration induces a larger confidence set, with
more biased types now being consistent with the data for any given q. Because RDD allows
more extreme types and eliminates few moderate types, the set of feasible outcomes with a
democratic majority tends to be broader than with a republican majority, generating larger
maximum errors and smaller minimum errors for given parameters.
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Figure 8: Min and Max Error Probability in Equilibria consistent with data for RRD (green)
and RDD (blue) specifications, with ρ = 0.5. As a function of Competence and Polarization.
In particular, as shown in Figure 8, the democratic controlled courts generate larger maxi-
mum errors than the republican controlled courts for homogeneous courts and intermediate
levels of competence, and smaller minimum errors for high levels of competence and het-
erogeneous courts.
6.3 The Impact of Deliberation
Having described the outcomes attained in equilibria with deliberation, our next goal is to
quantify the effect of deliberation: how much do outcomes differ because of deliberation?
To do this, we compare equilibrium outcomes with deliberation with the outcomes that
would have arisen in a counterfactual scenario in which judges are not able to talk with
one another before voting. As before, in terms of outcomes, we focus on the probability
of mistakes in the decisions of the court. We then compare the equilibrium probability of
error with deliberation with the corresponding equilibrium probability of error that would
have occurred in the absence of deliberation for the same court and case characteristics.
Specifically, for each point (θ, ~pi) in the identified set we compare the maximum and mini-
mum error probabilities across all equilibria, ε(θ, ~pi) and ε(θ, ~pi), and across equilibria con-
sistent with the data, ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) and ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv), with the corresponding maximum and
minimum error probabilities in responsive Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the voting
game without communication, εND(θ, ~pi) and εND(θ, ~pi). To carry out this comparison, we
solve for all responsive BNE of the non-deliberation game, for all parameter points in the
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confidence set.23
Figure 9 plots, for various values of judges’ information precision q, the maximum and
minimum equilibrium errors with and without deliberation as a function of the degree of
polarization in the court. The figures on the left panel show the maximum and minimum
error probability across all communication equilibria, and the figures on the right panel
show the maximum and minimum error probability in equilibria matching voting profile
distributions that are in the 95% confidence set of the “true” voting profile distribution.
All Equilibria. We consider first unconstrained outcomes, across all equilibria. The
figure on the top left panel shows the results for an intermediate level of competence,
q = 0.76. Two facts are apparent from the figure. First, although both the game with
deliberation and the game without deliberation have multiple equilibria, these two kinds
of multiplicity are qualitatively different. While the multiplicity of equilibria in voting
without deliberation has relatively minor consequences for the effectiveness of the court, the
multiplicity of equilibria with deliberation can lead to wildly different outcomes. Second,
the figure shows that while the equilibrium error bounds in the game with deliberation are
relatively insensitive to the level of polarization in the court, the equilibrium errors without
deliberation increase rapidly with the degree of polarization. Thus, in heterogeneous courts,
the best outcome with deliberation leads to large gains vis a vis the best outcomes without
deliberation. When courts are relatively homogeneous, instead, equilibrium errors without
deliberation are already close to the best outcomes achievable with deliberation, so that
the possible gain attributable to deliberation is relatively small. Furthermore, the worst
outcomes with deliberation imply very large losses with respect to all equilibrium outcomes
without deliberation.
The middle and bottom left panels (for q = 0.8 and q = 0.9) show a somewhat different
story. For these higher levels of competence in the court, the probability of error without
deliberation is close to the best outcomes with deliberation for all levels of polarization of
the court (for all bias configurations in the confidence set). Thus deliberation only allows
for a minimal gain in achieving a smaller probability of error, but significantly increases the
maximum equilibrium probability of error.24
In fact, it is these latter results, and not those in the top figure, which are most representative
of outcomes across all parameters in the confidence set. Whenever there exists a responsive
23Characterizing responsive equilibria in the non-deliberation game is an algebra-intensive, but simple
task. We discuss this further in Section 8.
24In fact, the worst outcomes with deliberation can and in general are worse than the errors in non-
responsive equilibria with communication (50% given ρ = 1/2).
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Figure 9: Probability of mistakes with and without deliberation for each point (θ, ~pi) in
the confidence set, with ρ = 0.5, across all equilibria (left), and across only equilibria
consistent with the data (right). Y-axis is the probability of error, and X-axis is the degree
of Polarization in the court. Black lines plot the min. and max. equilibrium errors with
deliberation; red and green lines plot the min. and max. errors without deliberation.
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equilibrium in the game without deliberation, deliberation typically only produces a small
potential gain in the effectiveness of the court in the best case scenario, but can lead to large
losses in the worst case. Across the confidence set, for courts with more competent judges
(q ≥ 0.8), the minimum equilibrium error probability with deliberation is less than 5 pp
lower than the corresponding error probability without deliberation. Yet at the same time,
the maximum equilibrium error probability with deliberation is more than 25 pp higher than
the corresponding error probability without deliberation. Especially, if we restrict attention
to courts with small degrees of polarization (polarization≤ 0.3) and very competent judges
(q = 0.9), the latter number becomes as high as 60 pp.
It should be noted, however, that deliberation does have an unambiguously positive effect
on outcomes, in that it expands the set of court characteristics for which the decisions of
the court can be responsive to information. Indeed, in slightly over one fourth of the court
configurations for which there is a communication equilibrium that is consistent with the
data, the game without deliberation has no responsive equilibria.
Equilibria Consistent with the Data. The figures on the right panel show the results
for equilibria consistent with the data. As we described in Section 6.2, the constraint that
equilibria are to be consistent with the data leads to a substantially narrower range of
outcomes. Moreover, the minimum and maximum errors in equilibria consistent with the
data are more responsive to the degree of polarization of the court.
The comparison with the equilibrium errors of the voting game without deliberation leads
to striking results. As in the case of all equilibria, the maximum equilibrium probability of
error with deliberation generally vastly exceeds the corresponding figure maximum without
deliberation. In addition, for a large number of points in the CS, the minimum equilibrium
probability of error with deliberation across equilibria consistent with the data is higher
than the minimum probability of error without deliberation. This is illustrated in Figure 10,
which plots the percentiles for maximum and minimum errors for equilibria with deliberation
and without deliberation across all comparable points in the 95% confidence set (for all
points in the CS for which there exists a responsive equilibrium without deliberation).
For 20% of the points in the confidence set, the minimum equilibrium probability of error
without deliberation is below 1%. The corresponding figure for equilibria consistent with
the data is 23%. Similarly, while for 70% of the points in the confidence set, the minimum
equilibrium probability of error without deliberation is still below 14%, it reaches 25%
for equilibria consistent with the data. Furthermore, for more than eighty percent of all
comparable points in the confidence set, all equilibria with deliberation are worse than all
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Figure 10: Percentiles for maximum and minimum errors for equilibria with deliberation
and without deliberation across all comparable points in the 95% confidence set.
equilibria without deliberation. Thus, although in the best case scenario deliberation can
potentially reduce mistakes vis a vis the benchmark of no deliberation, in the selection
of equilibria that is consistent with the data these potential gains are not being realized.
Instead, communication among judges on average leads to a large loss in the effectiveness
of the court.
Welfare. The results so far are agnostic about equilibrium selection, and highlight the
potential for deliberation to increase the errors in decision-making. It could be argued,
however, that equilibria that maximize judges’ aggregate welfare constitute a focal point,
both in the game with deliberation and in the game without deliberation. If this were
the case, deliberation could in fact improve welfare, and would certainly do so if we don’t
restrict to equilibria consistent with the data.
In order to quantify this potential gain, we adopt a utilitarian approach, and compare
social welfare in the equilibria that maximize the sum of judges’ payoffs with and without
deliberation, for all equilibria and for equilibria consistent with the data. For a given point
(θ, ~pi) in the confidence set, and given a communication equilibrium µ, judge i’s expected
utility is minus the expected cost of type I and type II errors,
Ui(µ; (θ, ~pi)) = − [ρεII(µ; (θ, ~pi))(1− pii) + (1− ρ)εI(µ; (θ, ~pi))pii] .
Therefore, the equilibrium that maximizes judges’ total welfare, µ∗(θ, ~pi), is the µ ∈M(θ, ~pi)
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that maximizes U(θ, ~pi, µ) ≡∑i Ui(µ; (θ, ~pi)). A similar definition applies for non-deliberation
equilibria, giving σ∗(θ, ~pi). For equilibria consistent with the data, the equilibrium that max-
imizes judges’ total welfare, µ˜(θ, ~pi), is
µ˜(θ, ~pi) = arg max
µ∈M(θ,~pi)
U(θ, ~pi, µ) s.t. pv(~v) = ∑
~t
µ(~v|~t)p(~t; θ)

The left panel of Figure 11 plots the maximum aggregate welfare for points in the confidence
set across all equilibria of the game with deliberation, UD(θ, ~pi) ≡ U(µ∗(θ, ~pi); (θ, ~pi)), and
in the game without deliberation, UN (θ, ~pi) ≡ U(σ∗(θ, ~pi); (θ, ~pi)). The difference is plotted
for various levels of competence q, as a function of the degree of polarization in the court.
The right panel provides a similar comparison restricting to the maximum aggregate welfare
across equilibria consistent with the data, U˜D(θ, ~pi) ≡ U(µ˜(θ, ~pi); (θ, ~pi)).
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Figure 11: Maximum Equilibrium Welfare under Deliberation and No-Deliberation. Solid
lines denote outcomes with deliberation, for ρ = 0.5. Dashed lines denote outcomes with
no deliberation.
The plot of the unconstrained maximum welfare with deliberation UD(θ, ~pi) and without
UN (θ, ~pi) shows that deliberation can induce a relatively large gain in welfare when the
court is heterogeneous. The gains in welfare however, are not uniform across feasible con-
figurations of the court. In fact, deliberation leads to no welfare improvement in 70% of
all comparable parameter configurations in the confidence set. The comparison of UN (θ, ~pi)
with the maximum welfare across equilibria consistent with the data, U˜D(θ, ~pi) shows a
markedly different result. In fact, for most of the parameter configurations represented
in the figure, deliberation induces a loss in the maximal aggregate welfare. This loss is
particularly severe if judges are highly competent (if q is large).
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7 Conclusion
Deliberation is ubiquitous in collective decision-making. This is well understood. What is
less clear is whether talking can have an effect on what people actually do. In this paper, we
quantify the effect of deliberation on collective choices. To do this we structurally estimate
a model of voting with deliberation. This approach allows us to disentangle committee
members’ preferences, information, and strategic considerations, and ultimately, to compare
equilibrium outcomes under deliberation with a counterfactual scenario in which pre-vote
communication is precluded.
Because the incentive for any individual member to convey her information truthfully to
others depends on her expectations about how others will communicate, any natural model
of deliberation will have a large multiplicity of equilibria. In our setting, this implies that
the structural parameters characterizing judges’ biases and quality of information are only
partially identified. For this reason, we obtain confidence regions for these parameters using
a two-step estimation procedure that allows flexibly for characteristics of the alternatives
and the individuals.
To quantify the effect of deliberation on outcomes we compare the equilibrium probability
of error with deliberation with the probability of error that would have occurred in the
absence of deliberation for the same court and case characteristics. The comparison leads to
discouraging results for the prospects of deliberation. When we compare across all potential
outcomes, in the best case deliberation produces a small gain in the effectiveness of the
court, and in the worst case it leads to large losses. When we restrict to equilibria that are
consistent with the observed data, the comparison is bleaker still. In fact, for a large range
of comparable points in the confidence set, all equilibria with deliberation are worse than
all equilibria without deliberation. Thus, although in the best case scenario deliberation
can potentially reduce mistakes vis a vis the benchmark of no deliberation, in equilibria
consistent with the data these potential gains are not realized. Instead, communication
among judges on average leads to large losses in the effectiveness of the court: words do
indeed get in the way of effective decision-making.
In spite of the progress made, much work remains ahead in order to fully understand the
effect of deliberation on collective decision-making. A potentially rich area for progress is
in the intersection of data availability and the specification of the model describing the
environment and the nature of strategic interactions. In the absence of knowledge of a
particular sequence in which committee members communicate prior to a vote, the theo-
retical approach of Gerardi and Yariv (2007) is very attractive. This is because the set
of outcomes induced by communication equilibria coincides with the set of outcomes in-
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duced by sequential equilibria of any possible communication sequence. Given knowledge
of a particular communication protocol, however, equilibrium analysis yields more precise
predictions. This, in turn, would allow us to obtain a narrower identified set of the pa-
rameters of interest. Furthermore, in this context we could potentially use not only vote
outcomes, but also the messages exchanged among committee members, or the duration of
deliberation, as data, further reducing uncertainty about parameters. It follows from this
discussion that while the difficulties in identifying suitable applications are not minor, the
potential rewards are far reaching.
Our empirical approach can also be more immediately extended to evaluate the effect of
deliberation on outcomes across different issues and decision-making environments.
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8 Appendix: Responsive Equilibria without Deliberation
In Section 6.3 we compare the equilibrium probability of error in voting with deliberation
with the corresponding equilibrium probability of error that would have occurred in the
absence of deliberation for the same court and case characteristics. Specifically, for each
point (θ, ~pi) in the confidence set we compare the maximum and minimum error probabili-
ties across all equilibria, ε(θ, ~pi) and ε(θ, ~pi), and across equilibria consistent with the data,
ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv) and ε∗(θ, ~pi, pv), with the corresponding maximum and minimum error proba-
bilities in responsive Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of the voting game without communi-
cation, εND(θ, ~pi) and εND(θ, ~pi). To carry out this comparison, we solve for all responsive
BNE of the non-deliberation game, for all parameter points in the confidence set.
In the game without deliberation, the strategy of player i is a mapping σi : {0, 1} → [0, 1],
where σi(si) denotes the probability of voting to overturn given signal si. It is easy to show
that σi(si) > 0 (< 0) only if Pr(ω = 1|si, P ivi) ≥ pii (≤ pii), or
Pr(si|ω = 1)
Pr(si|ω = 0)
Pr(Pivi|ω = 1)
Pr(Pivi|ω = 1) ≥
pii
1− pii
1− ρ
ρ
(8.1)
Let αiω ≡ Pr(vi = 1|ω) denote the conditional probability that i votes to overturn in state
ω, and note that αi1 = qiσi(1)+(1−qi)σi(0), and αi0 = (1−qi)σi(1)+qiσi(0). Substituting
in (8.1), we have that σi(si) > 0 only if (for j, k 6= i)
Pr(si|ω = 1)
Pr(si|ω = 0)
[
αj1(1− αk1) + αk1(1− αj1)
αj0(1− αk0) + αk0(1− αj0)
]
≥ pii
1− pii
1− ρ
ρ
(8.2)
Under certain conditions (when the court is sufficiently homogeneous) there is an equilibrium
in which all judges vote informatively ; i.e., σi(1) = 1, σi(0) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Note that
with informative voting αi1 = qi, and αi0 = (1 − qi). Then informative voting is a best
response for each i iff
ρ(1− qi)
ρ(1− qi) + (1− ρ)qi ≤ pii ≤
ρqi
ρqi + (1− ρ)(1− qi)
In general, other responsive equilibria are possible. With binary signals and a symmetric
environment (qi = q and pii = pi ∀i ∈ N), the literature has focused on symmetric responsive
BNE. Here of course the restriction has no bite. Still, there is a relatively “small” class of
equilibrium candidates for any given parameter value. The exhaustive list is presented in
Table 4.
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Judge i Judge j Judge ` Non-Generic
Eq. Class σ1(1) σ1(0) σ2(1) σ2(0) σ3(1) σ3(0)
Pure Strategies:
(EQ1.a) 1 0 1 0 1 0
(EQ1.b) 1 0 1 0 1 1
(EQ1.c) 1 0 1 0 0 0
All judges mix:
(EQ2) σ1 0 σ2 0 σ3 0
(EQ3) 1 σ1 1 σ2 1 σ3
(EQ4) σ1 0 σ2 0 1 σ3
(EQ5) σ1 0 1 σ2 1 σ3
Two judges mix:
(EQ6.a) σ1 0 σ2 0 1 1
(EQ6.b) σ1 0 σ2 0 0 0 X
(EQ6.c) σ1 0 σ2 0 1 0
(EQ7.a) 1 σ1 1 σ2 1 1 X
(EQ7.b) 1 σ1 1 σ2 0 0
(EQ7.c) 1 σ1 1 σ2 1 0
(EQ8.a) σ1 0 1 σ2 1 1 X
(EQ8.b) σ1 0 1 σ2 0 0 X
(EQ8.c) σ1 0 1 σ2 1 0
Table 4: We indicate by σj in column σj(s) that σj(s) ∈ (0, 1)
44
Characterizing responsive equilibria in the non-deliberation game is a laborious but simple
task. We illustrate the main logic in case (8.c) in Table 4; i.e., σi(1) ∈ (0, 1), σj(0) ∈ (0, 1),
σi(0) = 0, σj(1) = 1, and σk(1) = 1, σk(0) = 0. (The analysis of the other cases is similar;
full details are available upon request). Note that here α10 = (1− q1)σ1(1), α11 = q1σ1(1),
α20 = (1− q2) + q2σ2(0), α21 = q2 + (1− q2)σ2(0), α30 = 0, and α31 = 1.
In equilibrium, i = 1 has to be indifferent between upholding and overturning after s1 = 1.
Then if it exists, σ∗2(0) is given by the value of σ2(0) ∈ [0, 1] that solves (8.2) with equality
for i = 1 and si = 1, or
σ∗2(0) =
[q1(1− pi1)ρ− (1− q1)pi1(1− ρ)][(1− q2)q3 + q2(1− q3)]
(2q3 − 1)[q1(1− pi1)ρ(1− q2) + (1− q1)pi1(1− ρ)q2] ,
which in turn implies α∗20 = (1 − q2) + q2σ∗2(0) and α∗21 = q2 + (1 − q2)σ∗2(0). Similarly, in
equilibrium, i = 2 has to be indifferent between upholding and overturning after s2 = 0.
Then when it exists, σ∗1(1) is given by the value of σ1(1) ∈ [0, 1] that solves (8.2) with
equality for i = 2 and s2 = 0, or
σ∗1(1) =
(1− q2)q3(1− pi2)ρ− q2(1− q3)pi2(1− ρ)
(2q3 − 1)[(1− q2)q1(1− pi2)ρ+ q2(1− q1)pi2(1− ρ)] ,
which implies α∗10 = (1 − q1)σ∗1(1) and α∗11 = q1σ∗1(1). Finally, in equilibrium i = 3 has to
have incentives to vote informatively. This means that
1− q3
q3
≤︸ ︷︷ ︸
s3=1
α∗21(1− α∗11) + α∗11(1− α∗21)
α∗20(1− α∗10) + α∗10(1− α∗20)
· 1− pi3
pi3
· ρ
1− ρ ≤
q3
1− q3︸ ︷︷ ︸
s3=0
We can then evaluate numerically, for each point (ρ, ~q, ~pi) in the confidence set, if the
conditions for this to be an equilibrium are satisfied. As before, the error associated with
this equilibrium σ is εND(σ, θ) = (1 − ρ) Pr(v = 1|ω = 0;σ, θ) + ρPr(v = 0|ω = 1;σ, θ),
where given majority rule and independent mixing, for k, ` 6= j
Pr(v = 1|ω, σ, θ) =
3∑
j=1
αkωα`ω(1− αjω) + α1ωα2ωα3ω
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9 Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables
Variable: Mean Std.Dev.
Case characteristics:
FedLaw =1 if case prosecuted under federal law 0.8169 0.3868
Aggravated =1 if crime is aggravated assault/murder 0.1221 0.3274
White Collar =1 if white collar crime 0.2038 0.4029
Theft =1 if crime is theft 0.1418 0.3489
Narcotics =1 if drug-related crime 0.2062 0.4047
Rep. Majority =1 if ≥ 2 republicans on panel 0.4454 0.4971
Female =1 if ≥ 1 female judge on panel 0.0829 0.2758
Harv-Yale Majority =1 if ≥ 2 Harvard/Yale grads on panel 0.1809 0.3850
Jury instruction =1 if main legal issue is jury instruction 0.1970 0.3978
Sentencing =1 if main legal issue is sentencing 0.1628 0.3692
Admissibility =1 if main legal issue is admissibility of evidence 0.3474 0.4762
Sufficiency =1 if main legal issue is sufficiency of evidence 0.2543 0.4355
# cases: 3244
Judge characteristics:
Republican =1 if judge is republican 0.5392 0.4989
Yearsexp Years of appeals court experience 7.1893 7.8409
Judexp Years of prior judicial experience 1.9197 3.7628
Polexp Years of prior political experience 6.8547 7.0750
#judges: 523
Vote Outcomes:
Unanimous to Overturn 21.4%
Divided to Overturn 2.6%
Divided to Uphold 3.8%
Unanimous to Uphold 72.2%
Table 5: Summary statistics of data variables
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Table 6: Benchmark specification
Estimated Vote Probabilities pv(~v|X):
pˆv(111) =0.223 pˆv(000) =0.677
pˆv(101) =0.020 pˆv(010) =0.015
pˆv(110) =0.013 pˆv(001) =0.018
pˆv(100) =0.025 pˆv(011) =0.010
Case characteristics:
FedLaw =1 Jury instruction =0
Narcotics =0 Sentencing =0
Aggravated =0 Admissibility =1
White Collar =1 Sufficiency =0
Theft =0 Rep. Majority =1
Female Judge =0 Harvard-Yale Majority =0
Judge characteristics: Judge 1 Judge 2 Judge 3
Republican 1 1 0
Yearsexp 7.19 0 7.19
Judexp 1.92 0 1.92
Polexp 0 6.85 6.85
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Figure 12: Probability of Mistakes with and without Deliberation, with ρ = 0.5. Larger
Noise in Beliefs Consistent with Equilibrium: η = 0.0001 (left) and η = 0.01 (right). Main
Specification has η = 0.000001. Y-axis is the probability of error, and X-axis is the degree
of Polarization.
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